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Abstract
In the hope of future treatments to prevent or slow down the disease, there is a 
strong movement towards an ever‐earlier detection of Alzheimer’s disease (AD). In 
conjunction with scientific developments, this has prompted a reconceptualization of 
AD, as a slowly progressive pathological process with a long asymptomatic phase. 
New concepts such as ‘preclinical’ and ‘prodromal’ AD have been introduced, raising 
a number of conceptual and ethical questions. We evaluate whether these new con‐
cepts are theoretically defensible, in light of theories of health and disease, and 
whether they should be understood as disease or as an at‐risk state. We introduce a 
pragmatic view on disease concepts and argue that an evaluation of the reconceptu‐
alization of AD should also take its aims and effects into account, and assess their 
ethical acceptability. The reconceptualization of AD is useful to coordinate research 
into preventive strategies, and may potentially benefit future patients. However, in 
the short term, early detection and labelling of ‘preclinical AD’ can potentially harm 
people. Since there is no treatment available and the predictive value is unclear, it 
may only create a group of ‘patients‐in‐waiting’ who may suffer from anxiety, uncer‐
tainty and stigmatization, but will never actually develop dementia. We conclude that 
only if the promise of preventive medication materializes, will the reconceptualiza‐
tion of AD turn out unequivocally to be for the better. Otherwise, the reconceptual‐
ization may do more harm than good.
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THE C A SE
A 75‐year‐old man visits a memory clinic because of memory com‐
plaints over the past 6 months. His wife was the first to notice. He 
used to have a fantastic memory, but now he sometimes forgets con‐
versations they had. He also has a tendency to repeat a story he has 
told not so long ago. The couple live independently and have an ac‐
tive social life. The ‘patient’ plays tennis in a near‐by village, where he 
travels to by car or bike, depending on the weather. They have al‐
ways done the financial administration of their household together. 
This has not really changed, although he has become slightly 
insecure and lets his wife take more decisions than he used to. On 
formal cognitive testing he has slight memory impairment, but no 
impairment in other cognitive domains such as executive function‐
ing, language or visuospatial functioning.
This person clearly does not have dementia. In spite of some mem‐
ory impairment he has almost normal and independent daily func‐
tioning. But the question is whether he is showing signs of a very 
early stage of a devastating brain disease that will eventually lead to 
dementia. Should we aim to label this person as having a disease at 
this point? And can we actually predict with sufficient accuracy if 
and when this person will eventually develop dementia? And if so, 
would this person benefit from this prediction?
     |  139SCHERMER and RICHARD
1  | INTRODUC TION
In the hope of future treatments to prevent or slow down the dis‐
ease, there is a strong movement towards an ever‐earlier detection 
of Alzheimer’s disease (AD). It is believed that brain changes pre‐
sumed eventually to lead to dementia start to develop years to de‐
cades before clinical symptoms of dementia occur.1 It seems 
attractive to develop treatments that can stop or slow down these 
changes as early as possible, even before symptoms of cognitive im‐
pairment arise. It is now possible to detect certain biomarkers – pro‐
teins in cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) and protein depositions on 
neuroimaging – that are presumed to reflect the early brain changes 
that may eventually lead to clinical dementia, in persons with no or 
only mild cognitive impairment. Biomarkers are thus increasingly 
seen as means for early detection of the disease.2
In line with these scientific developments, a reconceptualization 
of the notion of AD is taking place. Instead of being defined by the 
clinical syndrome of dementia, AD is more and more depicted as a 
well‐defined slowly progressive pathological process with a long 
 asymptomatic phase. A new lexicon has even been proposed and 
new concepts and definitions have been introduced, such as ‘preclin‐
ical’ and ‘prodromal’ AD in those with no or only mild symptoms.3 
While currently mainly used in research, these new concepts of pre‐
clinical and prodromal AD, as well as the use of biomarkers that de‐
fine these ‘conditions’, which were originally intended for research 
purposes, are now gradually entering clinical practice.
This reconceptualization of AD, and the concomitant emerging 
use of biomarkers aiming to detect biological evidence of a presumed 
pathological process, raise a number of conceptual and ethical ques‐
tions. First, from a theoretical perspective it is questionable whether 
a state with abnormal biomarkers but without overt clinical symp‐
toms should be considered as a disease, or rather as an at‐risk state. 
For the persons it concerns, the distinction between risk prediction 
and a very early diagnosis of a much‐feared disease may not be that 
clear. This is further complicated by the fact that it is still contested 
how accurately biomarkers can predict future symptomatic disease. 
Hence, the exact meanings of biomarker‐based categorizations of 
preclinical and prodromal AD are unclear.
Second, from a moral perspective, the unclear predictive abili‐
ties of current biomarker tests and the current lack of meaningful 
treatment and prevention options – a lack of actionability – make 
it questionable whether the categorization of people as having an 
asymptomatic early phase of AD is defensible. It could create a group 
of ‘patients in waiting’ who may suffer from anxiety and fear for the 
future, but may never actually develop dementia.
Third, the motives for aiming at early detection are not always 
clear. Of course there is the intrinsic motivation of clinicians and re‐
searchers alike to stop the progression or even prevent the onset 
of dementia. Another driving factor is constant technological ad‐
vancement, leading to the ability to detect molecular disease mark‐
ers in body fluids as well as on neuroimaging. This technological 
advancement brings inevitable financial incentives, both for those 
who develop the biomarker tests (‘diagnostic tests’) and for those 
who foresee a large target population of people with an early stage 
of a disease for their new drugs. The persons it concerns are often 
driven by fear or the hope that something may be done to prevent 
a feared future with dementia; this may render them vulnerable to 
misconceptions and unrealistic expectations.
In this article we aim to address these important conceptual and 
ethical questions that result from the recent reconceptualization of 
AD. We will discuss whether the new concepts of preclinical and 
prodromal AD are theoretically defensible and ethically desirable 
and consider their implications for medical practice.
2  | FROM ALOIS AL ZHEIMER TO CURRENT 
DISE A SE CRITERIA
Historically, the notion of AD has changed considerably since Alois 
Alzheimer first described the case of Auguste D who developed ‘pre‐
senile dementia’ in her early fifties, in 1907. For decades, AD was 
considered a rare form of dementia with an onset at relatively young 
age. This as opposed to the common ‘senile dementia’, which was 
considered to be attributable to cerebral atherosclerosis. It was not 
until the 1970s that neurologist Robert Katzman first suggested that 
most dementia cases, also in later life, should be considered as AD.4 
This led to a radical change in disease concepts and a dramatic in‐
crease in interest of the scientific world in dementia. In the 1980s 
the proteins of which the plaques and tangles Alois Alzheimer de‐
scribed consisted were identified as amyloid‐β and tau, respectively. 
This further enhanced research and fueled the hope for earlier diag‐
nosis and potential treatment.
In parallel, clinical concepts started shifting, and the early dis‐
ease stages, before the onset of dementia – which is defined by im‐
pairment in daily functioning – got more attention. In the late 1990s, 
‘mild cognitive impairment’ (MCI) was introduced as an entity de‐
fined by cognitive impairment, but not severe enough to impair daily 
functioning.5 It became technically possible to assess the presence 
of amyloid‐β and tau protein in CSF and even using nuclear imaging 
of the brain. Combining early clinical detection with detecting these 
biomarkers has triggered a completely new way of thinking about 
1Scheltens, P., Blennow, K., Breteler, M. M., de Strooper, B., Fisoni, G. B., Salloway, S., & 
Van der Flier, W. M. (2016). Alzheimer’s disease. Lancet, 388, 505–517. 
2Ibid. 
3Sperling, R. A., Aisen, P. S., Beckett, L. A., Bennett, D. A., Craft, S., Fagan, A. M., … Phelps, 
C. H. (2011). Toward defining the preclinical stages of Alzheimer’s disease: recommenda‐
tions from the National Institute on Aging–Alzheimer’s Association workgroups on diag‐
nostic guidelines for Alzheimer’s disease. Alzheimer’s Dementia, 7(3), 280–292; Dubois, B., 
Feldman, H. H., Jacova, C., Cummings, J. L., Dekosky, S. T., Barberger‐Gateau, P., … 
Scheltens, P. (2010). Revising the definition of Alzheimer’s disease: A new lexicon. Lancet 
Neurology, 9, 1118–1127; Dubois, B., Feldman, H. H., Jacova, C., Hampel, H., Molinuevo, J. 
L., Blennow, K., … Cummings, J. L. (2014). Advancing research diagnostic criteria for 
Alzheimer’s disease: The IWG‐2 criteria. Lancet Neurology, 13, 614–629. 
4Fox, P. (1989). From senility to Alzheimer’s disease: The rise of the Alzheimer’s disease 
movement. The Milbank Quarterly, 67(1), 58–102 
5Whitehouse, P. J. (2007). Mild cognitive impairment – A confused concept? Nature 
Clinical Practice. Neurology, 3(2), 62–63; Petersen, R. C. (2007). Mild cognitive impairment: 
current research and clinical implications. Seminars in Neurology, 27(1), 22–31. 
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the disease, shifting from a clinical diagnosis based on functioning to 
a biological diagnosis with or without cognitive dysfunction.
From 2009 onward, this has led to the development of two new 
conceptual frameworks, by the U.S. National Institute on Aging and 
the Alzheimer’s Association (NIA‐AA) and an international working 
group for new research criteria for the diagnosis of AD (IWG).6 
According to these frameworks, AD is defined by a pathological pro‐
cess characterized by a specific sequence of brain changes, which 
develop over a long period of time and may or may not become 
symptomatic during life. Resulting from these frameworks, a new 
lexicon and new criteria have been proposed to capture these chang‐
ing conceptualizations. Biomarkers, which can be detected using 
CSF analysis, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanning and posi‐
tron emission tomography (PET) scanning, play an important role in 
these definitions (Table 1). The main difference between the two 
conceptual frameworks is that according to the NIA‐AA criteria one 
can have AD in the absence of any symptoms, whereas, according to 
the IWG, people without symptoms can only be labelled as ‘at risk 
for AD’. Both frameworks consider people with MCI and abnormal 
biomarkers as having AD, irrespective of whether their cognitive im‐
pairment is progressive and will lead to dementia.
So over the last century AD seems to have changed from a rare 
presenile form of dementia, clinically defined and characterized by 
the presence of cognitive impairment leading to functional decline, 
of which a certain diagnosis could only be made post‐mortem, to a 
common biologically defined condition in older people with or with‐
out cognitive impairment. The current views as represented in 
Table 1 illustrate the conception of AD as a slowly progressive 
pathophysiological process that will eventually lead to symptoms 
that will worsen and ultimately result in full‐blown dementia. This 
process can presumably be detected early on (before any clinical 
symptoms are present) and is – also presumably – unidirectional. The 
often‐invoked metaphor of a cascade (as in the amyloid cascade hy‐
pothesis7) indicates necessary progression in a single direction: inev‐
itable decline.
The current amyloid cascade model is, however, hypothetical. 
The biological mechanisms are still insufficiently understood and it is 
not certain that the brain changes that define the condition do inev‐
itably lead to symptoms. It is known that a considerable proportion 
of people dying in old age without cognitive impairment have a sub‐
stantial load of amyloid‐β and abnormal tau protein, considered to be 
the hallmarks of AD, in their brains.8 In contrast, these changes are 
not always found in those dying at a greater age with clear symptoms 
of dementia, which was clinically diagnosed as Alzheimer’s demen‐
tia.9 Moreover, of those with MCI, only 5–15% develop dementia per 
year, depending on the population under study. Those with MCI who 
have these ‘AD biomarkers’ in their brain, do not always develop fur‐
ther cognitive decline, and after several years a considerable propor‐
tion has not developed dementia.10 For people without cognitive 
impairment, data are scarce, but do suggest that abnormal biomark‐
ers are common and do not indicate imminent dementia in the ma‐
jority of people.11
This brings us back to our main question: how should we eval‐
uate the reconceptualization of AD? Are the new disease concepts 
theoretically defensible? And are they ethically desirable? We will 
start with the first question – which will eventually lead us to the 
second.
3  | AL ZHEIMER’S DISE A SE AND THEORIES 
OF HE ALTH AND DISE A SE
In order to consider the defensibility of the new disease concepts 
proposed in the AD field, we take a look at how health and disease in 
6Dubois et al. (2014), op. cit. note 3; Sperling et al., op cit. note 3. 
7Jack, C. R., Knopman, D. S., Jagust, W. J., Shaw, L. M., Aisen, P. S., Weiner, M. W., … 
Trojanowski, J. Q. (2010). Hypothetical model of dynamic biomarkers of the Alzheimer’s 
pathological cascade. Lancet Neurology, 9(1), 119–128. 
8Schneider, J. A., Arvanitakis, Z., Bang, W., & Bennett, D. A. (2007). Mixed brain patholo‐
gies account for most dementia cases in community‐dwelling older persons. Neurology, 69, 
24; Savva, G. M., Wharton, S. B., Ince, P. G., Forster, G., Matthews, F. E., Brayne, C.; 
Medical Research Council Cognitive Function and Ageing Study. (2009). Age, neuropa‐
thology, and dementia. New England Journal of Medicine, 360, 2302–2309. 
9Of course one could argue that those with Alzheimer changes without dementia simply 
died before they had the chance to develop symptoms and those with a clinical diagnosis 
of Alzheimer’s dementia who did not have AD pathology were misdiagnosed during life. 
Still, these data, as well as the data on MCI, cast doubt on the validity of the amyloid cas‐
cade hypothesis. 
10Heister, D., Brewer, J. B., Magda, S., Blennow, K., McEvoy, L. K.; Alzheimer’s Disease 
Neuroimaging Initiative. (2011). Predicting MCI outcome with clinically available MRI and 
CSF biomarkers. Neurology, 77, 1619–1628. 
11Wolfsgruber, S., Polcher, A., Koppara, A., Kleineidam, L., Frölich, L., Peters, O., … Wagner, 
M. (2017). Cerebrospinal fluid biomarkers and clinical progression in patients with subjec‐
tive cognitive decline and mild cognitive impairment. Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease, 58, 
939–950. 
TA B L E  1   Simplified representation of the new nomenclature for AD as suggested by the two working groups
State Biomarker presence NIA‐AA disease definition IWG disease definition
No cognitive impairment + Preclinical AD stage 1–2 Asymptomatic at risk for AD
Subtle cognitive 
impairment
+ Preclinical AD stage 3
MCI + MCI due to AD Prodromal AD
− MCI unlikely due to AD MCI
Dementia + Probable AD dementia AD dementia
− Dementia unlikely due to AD Dementia, not due to AD
Note. AD = Alzheimer’s disease; MCI = mild cognitive impairment.
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general have been conceptualized in the philosophy of medicine lit‐
erature. Two well‐known and influential theories in this field are 
those of Christopher Boorse and Lennart Nordenfelt. There is a 
long‐standing debate between proponents of these two theories, 
mainly focusing on the question of whether health and disease are 
value‐free concepts. Boorse and other naturalists claim that they 
are, while adherents of normativist theories such as Nordenfelt’s 
claim they are not.12 This difference in approach becomes apparent 
in the fact that Boorse’s biostatistical theory (BST) considers patho‐
physiological processes to be the objective, natural essence of dis‐
ease, whereas Nordenfelt’s holistic theory of health (HTH) considers 
the ability to attain vital goals, and hence the impact of clinical symp‐
toms on the lives of people, to be the fundamental aspect. This is 
also important for the discussion about AD.
Boorse’s BST defines health as statistically normal biological 
functioning of all parts of the organism, contributing to survival 
and procreation.13 He defines disease as any disturbance of health, 
and thus as statistically abnormal functioning of one or more parts 
of the organism. According to this theory, whether ‘preclinical AD’ 
is a disease depends on the question whether there actually is a 
pathological process going on in the brain.14 Boorse would say that 
if the nerve cells, neural networks, or brain tissues involved func‐
tion with less than typical efficiency, this implies that a disease 
process is present, even if there are no clinical symptoms. This is in 
line with the proposal of the NIA‐AA to consider the asymptom‐
atic stages of AD as disease states because, according to their 
view, pathophysiological changes are present in the brain, and 
these are seen as the essence of the disease. An interesting prob‐
lem here is that with increasing age, amyloid‐β and abnormal tau 
are present in an increasing number of people with increasing se‐
verity, eventually in up to over half of those over 80, irrespective 
of cognitive functioning.15 So, if we follow Boorse’s understanding 
of normal functioning as statistically normal in a specific reference 
group the presence of amyloid‐β and high abnormal tau levels do 
not constitute disease but are normal in this age group.16
Nordenfelt’s HTH, on the other hand defines health as being in 
a bodily and mental state that is such that one has the ability to 
realize all one’s vital goals.17 A disease is a bodily state or process 
that tends to reduce health, and so tends to prevent people from 
realizing their vital goals. According to this view, at first glance, 
‘preclinical AD’ is not a disease. Since there are no symptoms, the 
ability to attain vital goals is not compromised, and hence the per‐
son in question can be considered healthy. Several medical com‐
mentators have also stressed that, in the absence of symptoms, 
preclinical AD should not be considered a disease.18 This view is in 
line with the proposal of the IWG, which states we should speak of 
disease only when symptoms are present, i.e., in the prodromal 
and dementia stages. Asymptomatic presence of AD pathology, in 
their view, does not constitute disease but rather a risk factor for 
disease (‘asymptomatic at risk for AD’ as they call this ‘condition’). 
Even in prodromal AD, when there are only limited symptoms and 
it is uncertain if and when this will lead to dysfunction in daily life, 
it is questionable if, according to the HTH, these people should be 
considered as having a disease.
However, it is not uncommon in medicine to recognize asymptom‐
atic disease – for example asymptomatic cancer, or asymptomatic renal 
failure – and Nordenfelt would probably agree that these are diseases 
because over time they do indeed tend to reduce the ability to attain 
vital goals. The bigger the chance that a pathological process will lead to 
symptoms within a short timeframe, the more reason there is to call this 
condition a disease, according to the HTH. With regard to asymptom‐
atic presence of AD biomarkers, however, it is as yet unclear how high 
the chances of developing symptoms are, while it is clear that not all 
biomarker‐positive individuals will develop cognitive decline. Therefore 
we believe that, in line with the HTH and given the present state of 
scientific evidence, prodromal AD should not be called a disease.
In summary, at present the theoretical defensibility of preclin‐
ical AD as being an asymptomatic disease state, as proposed by 
the NIA‐AA and in line with Boorse’s theory of disease, is doubtful 
because scientific evidence is insufficient and because it is unclear 
whether at a certain age it may be a sign of normal aging. The con‐
ceptualization of the IWG, that understands the asymptomatic 
presence of biomarkers (‘preclinical AD’ according to NIA‐AA) to 
be a risk factor for developing symptomatic disease is more in line 
with Nordenfelt’s theory that sets the impact of disease symptoms 
on a person’s life – sometimes also referred to as ‘illness’19 – cen‐
tre stage. This usage of the term ‘disease’ as referring to symptom-
atic disease is more in line with that of ordinary people and clinical 
practitioners, whereas the NIA terminology, like Boorse’s theory, 
reflects the pathologist’s and researcher’s perspective.
4  | A PR AGMATIC APPROACH TO DISE A SE 
CONCEPTS
The debate about definitions of disease in the philosophy of med‐
icine has been focused primarily on the dispute between naturalist 
12Boorse, C. (1977). Health as a theoretical concept. Philosophy of Science, 44(4), 542–573; 
Boorse, C. (1997). A rebuttal on health. In J. M. Humber & R. F. Almeder (Eds.), What is 
disease? (pp. 3–133). Totowa, NJ: Humana Press; Nordenfelt, L. (1995). On the nature of 
health. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers; Nordenfelt, L. (2007). The 
concepts of health and illness revisited. Medicine, Healthcare and Philosophy, 10, 5–10. 
13Boorse 1977, op cit. note 12; Boorse 1997, op cit. note 12. 
14As mentioned above, there is some doubt about the accuracy of the amyloid cascade 
hypothesis, and the question of whether biomarkers do indeed represent pathology, i.e., 
abnormal physiological functioning. 
15Savva et al., op. cit. note 8; Richard, E., Schmand, B., Eikelenboom, P., Westendorp, R. G., 
& Van Gool, W. A. (2012). The Alzheimer myth and biomarkers research in dementia. 
Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease, 31(s3), S203–S209. 
16In a recent paper, however, Boorse seems open to the idea that young adults should be 
taken as the reference group for all adults, which would imply that various aspects of 
‘normal aging’ should be considered pathological in many cases. See: Boorse, C. (2014). A 
second rebuttal on health. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 39(6), 683–724. 
17Nordenfelt 1995, op. cit. note 12; Nordenfelt 2007, op. cit. note 12. 
18Giaccone, G., Arzberger, T., Alafuzoff, I., Al‐Sarraj, S., Budka, H., Duyckaerts, C., … 
Winblad, B. (2011). New lexicon and criteria for the diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease. 
Lancet Neurology, 10, 298–299. 
19Hofmann, B. (2002). On the triad disease, illness and sickness. Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy, 27(6), 651–673. 
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and normativist positions, and about what constitutes the essence 
of health and disease. We agree, however, with an argument by 
Kingma20 that a social–constructivist approach to health and dis‐
ease may be more fruitful, because it can unite those traditional 
positions and move the debate forward. Moreover, and very im‐
portant for our present evaluation of the reconceptualization of 
AD, social–constructivism does not merely focus on health and 
disease as general concepts, but recognizes that defining and de‐
marcating disease is a human activity; it is always a matter of dis‐
cussion, negotiation, consensus‐seeking and agreement among 
the experts involved. The processes of redefining AD by the work‐
ing groups mentioned above poses an excellent illustration of such 
a process.21
Social–constructivists do not attempt to give abstract defini‐
tions of what health and disease really are, but claim that this is 
contingent on human decisions and agreements.22 The entities we 
distinguish and the demarcation lines we draw are the result of 
human activity, not simply given by nature. Another way to put 
this is to say that diseases are not ‘natural kinds’ but ‘practical 
kinds’, and can change over time.23 The mere fact that two differ‐
ent groups of experts come up with similar, yet not identical pro‐
posals of how to ‘carve up’ the landscape of AD, illustrates this 
point. Scientific work as performed in these groups consists of 
drawing up definitions, agreeing on classifications, and providing 
argumentative and empirical justification for the choices made in 
this process. Social–constructivism claims that this is not a matter 
of ‘discovering’ some underlying true structure of the world, but 
rather of constructing useful and justifiable concepts and entities. 
Interestingly, this constructive nature of the reconceptualization 
of AD appears to be recognized by the medical research commu‐
nity itself: an editorial commentary in the Lancet speaks of ‘organ‐
ising the language of AD’;24 another talks of preclinical and 
prodromal AD as ‘conceptual constructs’.25 Moreover, it has been 
argued that various interests, beyond the interest of the ‘patient’, 
e.g., of pharmaceutical companies and of researchers, are at stake 
in this (re‐)construction of AD.26
A shortcoming of a purely social–constructivist approach, however, is 
that it is merely descriptive and not normative. It gives an account of how 
concepts of disease and disease classification are developed. As such, it 
offers no criteria to decide whether a certain conceptualization is a good 
one, or to determine whether one conceptualization, definition, or classi‐
fication is better or worse than another. We therefore propose a prag‐
matic approach to concepts and classifications of disease.27 Philosophical 
pragmatism understands definitions, concepts and classifications as tools. 
From this perspective, it makes sense to ask what new definitions or con‐
cepts are supposed to do – what their goal or aim is – and whether they 
do this well.28 Moreover, it makes sense to look at the, perhaps unin‐
tended or unforeseen, effects that the introduction and usage of these 
tools has, and take these into account in the evaluation. As Kingma says: 
‘the reason we should care about ideas, concepts and classifications is 
that they have effects’,29 and these effects can be good or bad, desirable 
or undesirable. Conceptions and classifications of diseases do not exist in 
a vacuum, but they influence practices, create new realities and have con‐
sequences for people’s lives. As such, they are ethically relevant and 
hence they can, and should, be evaluated from a moral point of view. 
Taking a pragmatic approach thus implies that a moral evaluation of the 
effects of a newly proposed concept, definition or classification, becomes 
an integral part of the evaluation of its defensibility. Whether the recon‐
ceptualization of AD is defensible is therefore not merely an epistemic, 
scientific question, but also a normative, moral issue. So, the questions 
become: what does the reconceptualization of AD aim to achieve and 
does it do so well? And what are the practical effects and consequences 
of this reconceptualization and are they desirable?
5  | E VALUATING THE CONCEPTS 
OF PRECLINIC AL AND PRODROMAL 
AL ZHEIMER’S DISE A SE
Evaluating the reconceptualization of AD in relation to scientific ev‐
idence is primarily a task for scientists, and one that is presently 
being taken on in the Alzheimer’s research literature. We have 
touched upon that discussion in Section 2, where we pointed out 
that the amyloid cascade hypothesis is not unanimously accepted 
among medical scientists, and different conceptualizations of AD, 
with a less prominent role for amyloid, exist as well.30 Here,  however, 
20Kingma, E. (2013). Health and disease: social constructivism as a combination of natural‐
ism and normativism. In H. Carel & R. Cooper (Eds.), Health, illness & disease. Philosophical 
essays (pp. 37–56). Durham, UK: Acumen. 
21George, D. R., Qualls, S. H., Camp, C. J., & Whitehouse, P. J. (2013). Renovating 
Alzheimer’s: ‘Constructive’ reflections on the new clinical and research diagnostic guide‐
lines. The Gerontologist, 53(3), 378–387. 
22This does not imply that diseases are merely constructions, or that they are arbitrary. It 
just claims that the natural world does not by itself determine the way in which we ought 
to ‘carve her up’; we make decisions about that. 
23Hacking, I. (1999). The social construction of what? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press; Zachar, P. (2002). The practical kinds model as a pragmatist theory of classification. 
Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 9(3), 219–227. 
24Schneider, L. S. (2010). Organising the language of Alzheimer’s disease in light of bio‐
markers. Lancet Neurology, 9, 1045. 
25Jack et al., op. cit. note 7. 
26George et al., op. cit. note 21: ‘Many of the authors of the guidelines are consultants to 
drug companies, and the field itself is strongly influenced by the pharmaceutical industry, 
whose economic interests powerfully shape and influence human comprehension of bio‐
logical processes.’ 
27See for example, Zachar, op. cit. note 23; Agich, G. (1997). Toward a pragmatic theory of 
disease. In J. M. Humber & R. F. Almeder (Eds.), What is disease? (pp. 219–246). Totowa, NJ: 
Humana Press; Ross, P. (2005). Sorting out the concept of disorder. Theoretical Medicine 
and Bioethics, 26, 115–140. Severinsen, M. (2001). Principles behind definitions of dis‐
eases – A criticism of the principle of disease mechanism and the development of a prag‐
matic alternative. Theoretical Medicine, 22, 319–336. 
28Petersen, R. C. (2013). Do preclinical Alzheimer’s disease criteria work? Lancet Neurology, 
12, 935. 
29Kingma, op. cit. note 20, p. 45. 
30Richards and Brayne state: ‘There exists a very deep disagreement about what 
Alzheimer’s disease is. According to the amyloid hypothesis, it is a clinico‐pathological 
entity consisting of specific brain pathology (plaques and tangles) and a specific set of 
clinical symptoms. According to other experts, Alzheimer’s disease is a “diffuse clinical 
syndrome representing the gradual accumulation of multiple pathologies, arising from 
multiple interlocking risk factors over the life course”.’ Richards, M., & Brayne, C. (2010). 
What do we mean by Alzheimer’s disease? British Medical Journal, 341, 865–867. 
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we will focus on evaluating the aims, goals and effects – both in‐
tended and unintended – of the concepts of preclinical and prodro‐
mal AD, referring to a state in which there is no dementia, but 
abnormal biomarkers presumably related to AD are present.
5.1 | Aims and goals of the reconceptualization
The first evaluative question to be asked from a pragmatic perspec‐
tive is: what are the aims of the new concepts and are these attained? 
From the articles published by the NIA‐AA and IWG it is apparent 
that the first aim of introducing the new concepts and classification 
is to enable and support research in this area. In order to perform 
research into the pathophysiological processes assumed to underlie 
AD, to test the amyloid hypothesis and to assess the predictive value 
of various biomarkers, it is necessary to use a common vocabulary 
and classification system. Likewise, in order to identify suitable re‐
search participants for prevention and early intervention trials, and 
to establish end‐points within such trials and compare trial results, a 
common lexicon is needed. In this respect, the newly proposed defi‐
nitions of preclinical and prodromal AD (and their further subclassifi‐
cations) are partly successful. Although there is no complete 
consensus, the aim of introducing a new vocabulary to support and 
align research in the Alzheimer field has been met to a certain extent, 
considering the establishment of large research programmes with 
accompanying funding.31 The ultimate goal is of course to enable 
early detection and intervention in order to prevent or modify the 
disease, and hence to decrease the number of people suffering from 
Alzheimer’s dementia. Whether this goal will be successfully at‐
tained, the future will tell. For the moment, no interventions aiming 
to prevent or modify clinical symptoms of dementia have been 
successful.
5.2 | Effects of the reconceptualization on 
individuals
The next important evaluative question regards the effects of the 
reconceptualization. These can be both intended or unintended – 
but sometimes foreseeable – and can manifest at either the indi‐
vidual or societal level.
A first concern here is what happens when the terminology that 
was introduced in the context of research, and intended primarily for 
communication between researchers, also gets employed in the clinic 
and in communication with research participants, patients and their 
family members, as is often the case. The emotional and social effects 
of terms chosen to communicate with lay‐people can be consider‐
able; being told one is ‘at risk’ for developing AD is different from 
being told one has preclinical or asymptomatic AD – although the sit‐
uations these terms aim to describe may be exactly the same. 
Likewise, being told one is in the early stages of AD is different from 
being told that biomarkers have been detected that may indicate that 
one is at increased risk of developing dementia within 10–15 years. In 
dealing with research participants and patients, terminology has dif‐
ferent connotations and effects than in communication among re‐
searchers. Terms chosen should convey a truthful image of the 
condition of the person, and not cause confusion, unnecessary anxi‐
ety or misconceptions.32 Giving someone a diagnosis can be under‐
stood as a ‘speech act’: it turns a healthy person or research participant 
into a patient, which has considerable psychological and social conse‐
quences and may be harmful, particularly in the case discussed here, 
where the person it concerns may never develop any symptoms.33
A second concern is that defining these new conditions of ‘being 
at risk’ or having preclinical and prodromal AD – whatever the exact 
terms that one uses to describe them – is not necessarily in the best 
interest of the people involved. As Kutschenko states: ‘diagnostic 
strategies of clinical research, which aim to obtain well‐defined study 
populations (e.g., invasive screening techniques) may be scientifically 
useful but not necessarily serve the needs of clinical practice.’34
Apart from the burdens of invasive techniques such as lumbar 
puncture, the condition these new terms describe may lead to a state 
of uncertainty and fear for the future. Knowing one is ‘at risk for’ or ‘in 
the early stages of’ AD can do psychological harm – by creating stress, 
anxiety, or depression – especially because there is nothing one can 
do to prevent further development of the disease, i.e., the acquired 
knowledge is not actionable. However, given the current uncertainty 
regarding the predictive value of biomarkers and given that a number 
of people with preclinical or prodromal AD, or MCI due to AD, may 
never develop dementia, much of this psychological stress may actu‐
ally be unnecessary. At this moment, there is insufficient evidence 
regarding the likelihood of such adverse psychological reactions, and 
it appears that persons who are voluntarily enrolled in clinical trials do 
understand that biomarkers confer an uncertain risk and may actively 
seek out that information.35 However, the interest in knowing one’s 
biomarkers decreases when people understand the uncertainty and 
limited actionability of the information.36
Another worry is that people may come to have a different percep‐
tion of themselves once they know about their condition, start to worry 
more over normal memory lapses or even develop a nocebo reaction, 
i.e., show cognitive decline as a result of getting labelled.37 Friends and 
31Ritchie, C. W., Molinuevo, J. L., Truyen, L., Satlin, A., Van der Geyten, S., Lovestone, S.; 
European Prevention of Alzheimer’s Dementia (EPAD) Consortium. (2016). Development 
of interventions for the secondary prevention of Alzheimer’s dementia: the European 
Prevention of Alzheimer’s Dementia (EPAD) project. Lancet Psychiatry, 3, 179–186. 
32Kutschenko, L. K. (2012). Diagnostic misconceptions? A closer look at clinical research 
on Alzheimer’s disease. Journal of Medical Ethics, 38(1), 57–59. 
33Ibid., 58. 
34Ibid. 
35Bemelmans, S. A. S. A., Tromp, K., Bunnik, E. M., Milne, R. J., Badger, S., Brayne, C., … 
Richard, E. (2016). Psychological, behavioral and social effects of disclosing Alzheimer’s 
disease biomarkers to research participants: a systematic review. Alzheimer’s Research & 
Therapy, 8, 46; Mozersky, J., Sankar, P., Harkins, K., Hachey, S., & Karlawish, J. (2018). 
Comprehension of an elevated amyloid positron emission tomography biomarker result by 
cognitively normal older adults. JAMA Neurology, 75, 44–50. 
36 Milne, R., Diaz, A., Richard, E., Badger, S., Gove, D., Georges, J., … Brayne, C. (2018). 
Perspectives on communicating biomarker‐based assessments of Alzheimer’s disease to 
cognitively healthy individuals. Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease, 62, 487–498. 
37Lineweaver, T. T., Bondi, M. W., Galasko, D., & Salmon, D. P. (2014). Effect of knowledge 
of APOE genotype on subjective and objective memory performance in healthy older 
adults. American Journal of Psychiatry, 171, 201–208. 
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family may also change their attitude or behaviour towards those per‐
sons and this may negatively interfere with their relationships.
On the other hand, it has been argued that people do have a right 
to know their risks, if they want, and that this would enable one to 
plan and prepare for the future – financially, mentally, with regard to 
life plans or lifestyle. Even though a risk prediction is not ‘actionable’ 
in the sense of available preventive or treatment options, it is often 
claimed it can still be used for such non‐medical purposes.38 However, 
as we have argued elsewhere in more detail, as long as the prognostic 
value of the diagnosis ‘preclinical AD’ is so unclear and hence risk pre‐
diction is inaccurate, this argument has a limited validity.39 
At present, there is insufficient knowledge about the actual fre‐
quency of these potential harms and burdens and about their sever‐
ity. Little is known about the psychological impact of learning one’s 
risk status, or learning that one has ‘preclinical’ or ‘prodromal’ AD.
5.3 | Societal effects
Finally, we should consider the effects of the reconceptualization on a 
societal level.40 Depending on the context and the level of public 
awareness, a large proportion of the elderly population may eventually 
prove to be ‘at risk for AD’ or even to have (an early stage of) AD. 
Although population‐based screening programmes for those over 65 
do not seem very likely at this moment, other levels of screening for 
cognitive impairment may become reality, such as in the context of 
comprehensive geriatric assessments, which are increasingly popular, 
or opportunistic screening in those who are presumed to be at risk for 
cognitive impairment due to clinical or demographic characteristics.
Labelling large numbers of people as such will inevitably raise 
questions about medicalization of aging and age‐related memory 
problems, since a growing number of people will be diagnosed with 
AD without clinical dementia or MCI being present; and without 
being sure whether they would ever develop it. The number of ‘pa‐
tients‐in‐waiting’, as they have been called,41 would increase enor‐
mously. This might also reinforce prejudice about elderly people, 
stigmatize them and increase age discrimination.
If medication becomes available in the longer run, depending on 
its effectiveness and risk‐ and side‐effect profiles, this would of 
course pose new questions. Who should use this medication and 
how could we prevent over‐medication? How to make sure interests 
of patients and not only those of the pharmaceutical industry are 
prioritized? Who should pay for medication, how can equal access be 
assured, and how much priority should AD prevention get? Would it, 
at some point, be a good idea to initiate screening programmes and, 
if yes, in which population?42
5.4 | Taking stock
So, from an individual as well as societal perspective, it is question‐
able whether the reconceptualization of AD is desirable. Is it a good 
idea to distinguish, to name and to detect a condition of ‘being at 
risk for developing AD dementia’ in the first place? The answer is 
that it might be, in the long run, if the hypothesis on which current 
research efforts are based proves to be right, and if effective, safe 
and affordable preventive medication is developed. However, this is 
by no means a certainty.
For the short term, with the current state of affairs, the answer 
is likely to be ‘no’. Detecting and labelling an uncertain condition of 
being at risk – although we do not exactly know how big a risk – for 
developing AD dementia somewhere in the future does little bene‐
fit, as long as the predictive value is unclear and there are no effec‐
tive preventive measures available.
The reconceptualization is taking out a mortgage on the future 
success of a specific research agenda, but it may do so at the expense 
of current research participants, patients and older people in general. 
This is not necessarily unethical but we should at least be aware of it, 
weigh the pros and cons and minimize the negative effects. One way 
to do this is to be very careful with the vocabulary used to address 
research participants. As Alzheimer Europe states in a recent report: 
‘Careful attention should be paid by researchers to the terminology 
surrounding what is currently defined as pre‐clinical AD and to its 
possible impact on research participants and the general public.’43 
They recommend, for example, that research participants falling in 
the preclinical AD category, should be described as ‘being at risk of 
AD’ rather than as ‘having preclinical AD’, and that researchers should 
speak of ‘disclosure of risk status’, rather than of ‘diagnosis’.44
Moreover, we believe clinicians who are also involved in research 
should be acutely aware of these issues and should take utmost care not 
to conflate research language with clinical language when speaking to 
patients. We should consider the reconceptualization and the proposed 
terminology and classification as research tools, not as referring to clinical 
38For example, Vanderschaeghe, G., Schaeverbeke, J., Vandenberghe, R., & Dierickx, K. 
(2017). Amnestic MCI patients’ perspectives toward disclosure of amyloid PET results in a 
research context. Neuroethics, 10, 281–297; Holt, G. R. (2011). Timely diagnosis and dis‐
closure of Alzheimer disease gives patients opportunities to make choices. Southern 
Medical Journal, 104, 779–780. 
39Bunnik, E. M., Richard, E., Milne, R., & Schermer, M. H. N. (2018). On the personal utility 
of Alzheimer’s disease‐related biomarker testing in the research context. Journal of 
Medical Ethics. https://doi.org/10.1136/medethics‐2018‐104772 
40Karlawish, J. (2011). Addressing the ethical, policy, and social challenges of preclinical 
Alzheimer disease. Neurology, 77, 1487–1493; Boenink, M., Cuijpers, Y., van der Laan, A. L., 
van Lente, H., & Moors, E. (2011). Assessing the sociocultural impacts of emerging molec‐
ular technologies for the early diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease. International Journal of 
Alzheimer’s Disease, Article ID 184298; Schicktanz, S., Schweda, M., Ballenger, J. F., Fox, P. 
J., Halpern, J., Kramer, J. H., … Jagust, W. J. (2014). Before it is too late: professional re‐
sponsibilities in late‐onset Alzheimer’s research and pre‐symptomatic prediction. Frontiers 
in Human Neuroscience, 20, 921. 
41Timmermans, S., & Buchbinder, M. (2010). Patients‐in‐waiting: Living between sickness 
and health in the genomics era. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 51, 408. 
42Le Couteur, D. G., Doust, J., Creasey, H., & Brayne, C. (2013). Political drive to screen for 
pre‐dementia: not evidence based and ignores the harms of diagnosis. British Medical 
Journal, 347(9), f5125. 
43Alzheimer Europe. (2016). Discussion paper on ethical issues linked to the changing defi‐
nitions/use of terms related to Alzheimer’s disease. Retrieved from https://www.alzhei‐
mer‐europe.org/Publications/Alzheimer‐Europe‐Reports 
44Ibid. 
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entities. The AD research community should take responsibility to pre‐
vent terms like ‘preclinical AD’, ‘asymptomatic AD’ or ‘at risk for AD’ from 
prematurely entering the consulting room and the public domain.45
6  | CONCLUSION
While the reconceptualization of AD, and especially the introduction 
of the notion of preclinical or asymptomatic AD, might seem attrac‐
tive for research into preventive strategies, and may have the poten‐
tial to benefit future patients, it will not benefit individuals in the short 
term. It may lead to diagnosing a pre‐symptomatic condition that in 
a considerable proportion of cases will never become symptomatic. 
This can be harmful for individuals and their caregivers. It is impor‐
tant to consider the possible harmful effects of creating these new, 
uncertain and unclear conditions of pre‐dementia AD in evaluating 
the defensibility of the proposed reconceptualization. A fundamental 
shortcoming in the current scientific AD debate is that illness is over‐
looked and that the disease is being oversimplified by characterizing it 
as the presence of biological abnormalities which in themselves cor‐
relate poorly with the clinical symptoms of cognitive impairment.
We conclude that the reconceptualization of AD is legitimate and 
meaningful for usage within a narrowly defined research community 
studying a clearly defined biological condition, namely the presence 
of specific measurable biomarkers, but that translation to clinical 
practice poses various ethical and communication problems. It is too 
early to move those concepts from research into the clinical setting, 
since they are based on a disputed hypothesis and since attempts to 
do so may actually be harmful to the people concerned. The distinc‐
tion between research and clinical practice may be difficult to main‐
tain, however, and it appears as if the use of biomarkers is slowly 
creeping into clinical practice, without proper scientific 
underpinning.46
Whether it is a good idea to move toward ever‐earlier diagnosis of 
AD, or of detecting at‐risk states for AD dementia, is a complex ques‐
tion. A good predictive value and actionability are important precondi‐
tions for the ethical implementation of predictive testing. With regard 
to the first condition, biomarker tests for AD currently fall short, while, 
for the time being, the second is limited to ‘preparing for one’s future’. 
Only if the promise of preventive medication materializes, will the 
reconceptualization of AD turn out to be unequivocally for the better. 
However, if the attempts to develop such medication continue to fail, 
the reconceptualization may do more harm than good.
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